Persecution of Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: The Reality of State-Backed Discrimination
Society
2026年7月14日
5
The Diplomat Indonesia

Persecution of Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: The Reality of State-Backed Discrimination

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The severe persecution faced by the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan is exacerbated not only by extremist violence but also by discrimination rooted in the state's constitutional and legal framework. Although Ahmadis identify as Muslims, they are constitutionally defined as "non-Muslims," rendering their religious expressions punishable offenses.

Read The Diplomat, Know The Asia-Pacific Extremist-led mob violence in Pakistan often leads to further persecution – at the hands of the state. Early this year, on April 18, Laeeq Ahmed Cheema, a 46-year-old Ahmadi, went to an Ahmadiyya mosque in Karachi – the kind of place Pakistan’s anti-Ahmadi laws make dangerous even to name as a mosque. He did not return home. Outside the worship site, a mob had gathered and Cheema was beaten to death. According to the Associated Press, the Ahmadi community blamed the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a hardline Islamist religio-political party known for mobilizing around blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi campaigns. Less than a week later, on April 24, Muhammad Asif, a 19-year-old Ahmadi youth from Bhullair in Kasur district, was shot dead; another young man, Ihsan Ahmad, was critically injured. The International Human Rights Committee, a London-based religious freedom NGO, allowed The Diplomat to preview its upcoming report chronicling the persecution of Ahmadis from June 2024 to December 2025. That report attributes the attack on Asif to a reported TLP affiliate and says no arrests were made. In May, Tahir Mahmood, a 71-year-old Ahmadi, was arrested after attending Friday prayers. According to the same report, he was beaten and tortured in police custody, denied bail, subjected to weeks of abuse, and died as a result. On May 16, Dr. Sheikh Mahmood, a 58-year-old Ahmadi gastroenterologist in Sargodha, was shot dead inside his hospital, reportedly after prior threats. All of these victims, despite being in different daily businesses in their community – a businessman, a student, an elderly worshipper, a doctor – were all targeted for one reason: they were Ahmadi. Ahmadis identify themselves as Muslim. They pray, read the Quran, fast, celebrate Eid, and understand themselves as part of Islam. But the Pakistani state does not accept that self-identification. Pakistan’s Constitution lacks space for a true freedom of religion and belief. According to Article 260(3) of Pakistan’s Constitution, “Muslim” is defined through belief in the “absolute and unqualified finality” of the prophethood of Muhammad. The constitution then defines “non-Muslim” to include “a person of the Quadiani Group or the Lahori Group who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name,” alongside Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis, and Bahais. The delisting of Ahmadis from Muslim community by Pakistani legal structure became even harsher in 1984, when Ordinance XX inserted Sections 298-B and 298-C into the Pakistan Penal Code. Section 298-B criminalizes Ahmadis for using certain Islamic terms and for calling their place of worship a “Masjid,” the Arabic term for a mosque. It also criminalizes Ahmadis for referring to their call to prayer as “Azan.” Section 298-C criminalizes an Ahmadi who “poses” as Muslim, calls or refers to their faith as Islam, preaches or propagates it, or invites others to accept it. Based on the penal code, punishment can reach three years in prison and a fine. This intentional listing of Ahmadi Muslims in the legal order among non-Muslim faiths, in a deeply Muslim and conservative country, has made discrimination against Ahmadis not only a matter of social hostility or extremist violence, but something placed at the heart of the Pakistan state itself. In such circumstances, whenever members of the Ahmadiyya community try to establish mosques as spaces for prayer, read the Quran, or practice Islam as other Muslims do, it triggers certain groups. Because the constitution classifies Ahmadis as non-Muslims, and the penal code permits their practice of Islam to be labeled as blasphemy, it has created the conditions in which mobs and religious clerics can easily threaten and incite violence against the community. When state protection is required, the police often simply restrict Ahmadis further. Courts can punish members of the community for alleged blasphemy – as seen in the Mubarak Sani case, in which Sani was sentenced to life imprisonment in December 2025 for teaching and memorizing the Holy Quran. And the state claims that it is only maintaining public order, all because its own constitutional and legal framework permits this discrimination. Therefore, for the Ahmadiyya community, persecution is a part of their daily life, no matter if it is on Friday prayers, Eid prayers, burials, voting, identity documents, religious language, and even the right to call oneself Muslim. Farooq Aftab, an Ahmadi academic from the Secretariat of the International Human Rights Committee said, “The legal discrimination is not subtle – it is textual and state-sponsored.” Article 260(3) “constitutionally defines Ahmadis as non-Muslims, while Sections 298-B and 298-C criminalize core elements of Ahmadi religious expression,” Aftab continued. According to Aftab, that legal structure gives violence against Ahmadis a ready-made language of accusation. A mob attacking an Ahmadi mosque can present itself not as lawless, but as enforcing religious boundaries the state itself has drawn. A cleric demanding the sealing of an Ahmadi mosque can frame discrimination as law enforcement. A police officer can restrict worship and claim he is preventing unrest. This is how law becomes permission for persecution of a minority. When asked whether extremist-led mob violence in Pakistan often leads not to protection for Ahmadis, but to further restrictions imposed by the government, he said, “Yes, and the distinctive feature is that the ‘middle step’ is often the state.” Aftab continued, “Extremist actors pressure authorities, authorities respond by restricting Ahmadi worship, and then accountability for attackers is weak while Ahmadis face FIRs/arrests.” This is what makes the persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan different from isolated mob violence. The mob is only one part of the system. The other part is the state’s willingness to convert extremist pressure into administrative action. Amnesty International documented this around Eid-ul-Adha in June 2025, reporting that authorities across Pakistan prevented Ahmadis from celebrating the Eid festival, including forcing individuals to sign affidavits to refrain from Eid prayers and ritual. The report noted that after incidents of harassment of Ahmadis by violent mobs after Friday prayers on a near-weekly basis during Ramadan, in Sindh and Punjab provinces, instead of protecting the community authorities detained at least 63 Ahmadis for offering prayers. Eventually the country banned Ahmadis from celebrating Eid, which according to the International Human Rights Committee, “marked a dangerous new depth in state-backed persecution.” The cruelty extends beyond the living. Ahmadi graves have repeatedly been desecrated because they carry Islamic inscriptions. In some cases, communities have reportedly faced pressure to remove religious symbols from graves or worship sites. Aftab argued that police and local administrati

多角的分析

経済的影響

パキスタンのアハマディア派に対する国家的な差別は、経済活動にも深刻な影響を与えている。アハマディア派のビジネスオーナーや専門家が標的となり、職務遂行中に殺害される事件は、コミュニティ全体の経済的機会を奪う。また、彼らが事業を営む上での法的・社会的な制約は、投資や経済発展の阻害要因となりうる。特に、宗教的表現の自由の欠如は、多様な人材の活用を妨げ、経済の停滞を招く可能性がある。

投資家心理

パキスタンにおけるアハマディア派への迫害は、投資環境にとって無視できないリスク要因である。国家が主導する差別は、法の支配や人権保護に対する信頼を揺るがし、外国投資家にとって政情不安や予見不可能性を高める。特に、宗教的マイノリティに対する暴力や差別の蔓延は、企業のESG(環境・社会・ガバナンス)基準への適合性を問う投資家にとって、投資回避の大きな理由となりうる。長期的な視点では、このような社会的不安定性は、パキスタンの経済成長の潜在力を損なう。

社会的影響

パキスタンにおけるアハマディア派への迫害は、宗教的寛容性という社会の基盤を蝕んでいる。カラチでアハマディア派信者がモスク付近で殺害された事件や、サルゴダの医師が病院内で射殺された事件は、宗教的少数派が日常生活を送ることさえ困難な状況を示している。憲法や刑法によって「非ムスリム」と定義され、イスラム教徒としての自己認識や宗教的実践が禁じられることは、アハマディア派の人々から尊厳と自己決定権を奪い、社会からの孤立を深めている。さらに、墓石の desecration は、死者への敬意すら否定する残虐性を示しており、社会全体の道徳観にも疑問を投げかけている。

市民の声

パキスタンのアハマディア派市民は、文字通り「見えないところで」迫害されている。彼らは、イスラム教徒として生活を送りたいと願うも、国家によって「非ムスリム」とされ、イスラム教徒が当然のように行う宗教的行為(モスクをモスクと呼ぶ、イスラム教の用語を使う、礼拝を行うなど)が罰せられる。これは、彼らのアイデンティティそのものを否定されるに等しい。特に、テヘリク・エ・ラッバエク・パキスタン(TLP)のような過激派組織が、国家の法制度を盾に暴力を振るう構造は、一般市民が法的な保護を期待できない状況を生み出している。ラマダン中の礼拝で拘束されたり、イードの祝祭を禁じられたりすることは、彼らの日常的な生活や信仰の自由を著しく侵害している。

背景・歴史的文脈

パキスタンにおけるアハマディア派への迫害は、1974年に憲法でアハマディア派が「非ムスリム」と定義されたことに端を発する。これは、イスラム教徒の定義を厳格化し、アハマディア派の信教の自由を制限する動きの始まりであった。1984年の「Ordinance XX」により、刑法にセクション298-Bと298-Cが追加され、アハマディア派がイスラム教の用語を使用したり、モスクを「マスジド」と呼んだりすること、さらにはイスラム教徒を名乗ること自体が刑罰の対象となった。この法制度は、過激派による暴力行為を助長し、国家による差別を正当化する根拠となっている。アハマディア派は、礼拝、埋葬、投票、身分証明書、宗教的言語、そしてイスラム教徒と名乗る権利に至るまで、日常生活のあらゆる側面で差別と迫害に直面している。

原文ソース

The Diplomat Indonesia

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