Re-engaging with Myanmar: Why ASEAN Must Think Beyond Naypyidaw

ASEAN should stop equating the military junta in Naypyidaw with Myanmar as a whole. To do so would be to overlook the fundamental shift where alternative governance mechanisms are already in place. By Yuyun Wahyuningrum The Jakarta Post The Myanmar that ASEAN is attempting to re-engage with is no longer the country it was before the 2021 coup. For decades, regional diplomacy has operated on the assumption that influence over Naypyidaw was synonymous with influence over Myanmar as a whole. Five years on, that assumption is increasingly untenable. Across the country, ethnic revolutionary organizations, resistance movements, and local administrations are not only challenging the military dictatorship but also building alternative governance systems. While some ASEAN member states are resuming engagement with the Myanmar military junta authorities with the aim of achieving stability, this risks overlooking the fundamental political shifts occurring far from the capital (Naypyidaw). This debate has intensified in The Jakarta Post after the Myanmar embassy officially responded on June 20 to an opinion piece published on May 15, titled “Recognizing the Junta as Normal Will Not Bring Peace.” This exchange reflects a key dilemma in ASEAN diplomacy: whether engagement with the State Administration Council (SAC) remains a practical necessity or amounts to indirectly recognizing military rule as normal, as Myanmar’s political system. This distinction is not merely semantic but directly impacts the essence of the ASEAN organization’s prestige and credibility. Proponents of resuming engagement point to the severe spillover effects of the Myanmar crisis on its neighbors. For Thailand and other neighboring countries, the crisis is an immediate security threat. The rise of cyber fraud operations, human trafficking, mass displacement, and cross-border armed conflict continue to pressure border management. Despite repeated crackdowns, hundreds of people remain trapped in scam compounds along the Myanmar-Thailand border, highlighting how the breakdown of governance has allowed transnational criminal syndicates. Therefore, the main question is not whether ASEAN should engage with Myanmar, but whether that engagement leads to recognizing the junta as a normal entity, which no longer controls sovereign authority across the entire country. Today’s Myanmar is defined by a deepening humanitarian crisis, fractured governance, and expanding territories controlled by resistance forces. While the junta retains its diplomatic facade and coercive capacity, its territorial and administrative reach has significantly diminished. Recent UN reports indicate that hundreds of civilians have been killed in recent months due to relentless military operations, including airstrikes and ground offensives. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has warned that despite repeated diplomatic calls, international indifference exacerbates the suffering of civilians amid rising risks of displacement, food insecurity, and vulnerability. These dire ground realities do not align with any claims of achieved stability or a return to a normal political system. Concurrently, the governance system on the ground has become increasingly pluralistic. While ethnic armed organizations have long administered territories in border regions, these arrangements have become more extensive and formalized since the coup. They have established not only armed resistance but also functioning administrative systems responsible for education, healthcare, justice, humanitarian coordination, and local governance. New political organizations have also emerged to coordinate resistance and foster federal transitions. These include the National Unity Government (NUG), formed in March 2021; the National Unity Advisory Council (NUCC), formed the following month; the Federal Transition Measures Basic Law (AFTA), which emerged in 2024; and the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), which emerged in March 2026. While these initiatives are not yet fully realized and remain contentious, they reflect continuous efforts to forge governance structures outside of military control. In Karenni, Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Rakhine states, local governance experiments are putting federal principles into practice, making federalism a lived reality for many rather than a distant constitutional aspiration. These developments should not be viewed romantically. Limited capacity, weak coordination, and deep political divisions persist, with no guarantee that these groups will ultimately coalesce. However, to overlook them would be to misread the ground reality of where actual power lies. This is precisely where the debate over “recognizing as normal” becomes critical. In its response to the aforementioned article, the Myanmar embassy began by arguing that engagement with the junta is legitimate and necessary from the perspective of political continuity. It posited that the Myanmar military is the only unavoidable route for diplomacy, an organization