The Mecca Pact: Repeating Past Failures or Forging New Security?

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA), signed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in early August, has sparked various interpretations regarding its significance and impact on regional security. However, from a historical perspective, the MJDA bears strong resemblances to the failed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) of the Cold War era, leading to analyses that suggest its effectiveness will be limited. CENTO was established in 1955, primarily involving Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. The United States also participated as an observer, reflecting the global geopolitical climate of the time, marked by the capitalist-communist divide. However, the pact faced early fractures, including Iraq's withdrawal following a coup, diverging national interests among member states, and U.S. sanctions against Turkey. Consequently, it failed to achieve its intended deterrent effect or foster significant economic cooperation. While the current global context shares some superficial similarities with the 1950s, the MJDA is seen to possess similar structural weaknesses as CENTO. Firstly, Pakistan remains embroiled in low-intensity conflicts with India, which it perceives as its primary threat. Secondly, Turkey, despite possessing the largest ground force within NATO, has limited conventional capabilities to offer Riyadh. Furthermore, the extent to which Pakistan and Turkey will align with Saudi Arabia's regional adventurism is questionable. Both Pakistan and Turkey already benefit from nuclear umbrellas, diminishing their incentive to join the MJDA. Given the diverse security challenges faced by its member states and the lack of impetus for collective action, the MJDA is likely to be a "treaty without teeth." Experts predict that, much like CENTO in the past, the MJDA will not fundamentally alter its member states' individual defense and security planning, and its impact will remain confined.