China's Military-Industrial Complex and the Contradictions in its National Strategy

Photo – A Chinese ZTZ-99A2 tank participates in a military exercise in the Alabino area of Russia on July 29, 2017. Chinese arms exports may decline after the end of the Ukraine war. The National Interest Over the past several decades, China's military-industrial complex has exhibited interesting contradictions. Notably, China has secured firm customers in Pakistan, Serbia, Thailand, and Algeria, accounting for 80 percent, 61 percent, 49 percent, and 27 percent of these countries' total arms imports, respectively. From 2015 to 2025, it sold a variety of major heavy weapons and small arms to at least 16 countries, and during that period, it sold tens of thousands of missiles to Pakistan alone. However, its track record in actual combat and the weaknesses found in the maintenance processes of Chinese weapons have impacted China's prospects as a reliable arms supplier. Therefore, whether China can acquire more firm customers depends more on its ability to control the shortcomings in battlefield performance, the increasingly stringent scrutiny from Western countries, and domestic organizational constraints, rather than the affordability of Chinese weapons. The evidence presented below indicates that China will not be able to overcome these challenges in the short to medium term, at least. Factors Driving China's Arms Exports The first factor is the logic of using arms exports as a practical test of combat operations. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China has not fought a major conventional war since 1979. Chinese weapon systems have only been tested in the field through other intermediary organizations, and this has now become a deliberately shaped strategy. Iran's Shahed-136 drone is not exclusively a Chinese product, but it is manufactured with engines, cameras, and processors supplied by Chinese companies such as Mile Haoxiang and Chengdu Honphu Technologies. The successes these drones have achieved in attacking American bases in West Asia have created a direct feedback loop between users and manufacturers. The second point is that as arms trade has strengthened, China's strategic influence over buyer countries has also caused complications for rival nations. By assisting countries like Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Venezuela, Myanmar, and Thailand, China gains opportunities to achieve a slight advantage over rivals such as the United States, Western bloc, and India. Looking at the case of Myanmar, the benefits gained by China's disregard for debt repayment capacity and human rights scrutiny, or its supply of dual-use technology items to sanctioned countries like Iran, have created opportunities for China to exchange for economic benefits. The third point is the need to build a profitable military-industrial system that is protected from long-term jurisdiction and supply chain disruptions. China has already laid the main pillars for this military-industrial complex (MIC). In addition to major defense state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as NORINCO, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC), and China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), China has also strengthened and integrated millions of private companies, from Unitree, Hikvision, and Baidu to Spacety and Qihoo 360. Furthermore, due to current geopolitical rivalries, China has built a legal protective wall for its military-industrial complex (MIC). The Export Control Law of 2020, the Cybersecurity Law of 2021, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of 2021, along with State Council Orders No. 834 and 835 issued in April 2026, are intended to protect supply chains and foster a successful ecosystem. This protective wall has allowed state-owned military enterprises to function as instruments of political power. However, domestic instability caused by crackdowns on corruption in the arms procurement and equipment development sectors has now created significant obstacles to the performance and reliability of these enterprises. Poor Performance of Chinese Military Equipment Abroad As China's arms export market has expanded, technical and quality weaknesses have also emerged. For example, in December 2025, a VT-4 main battle tank of the Royal Thai Army exploded its 125mm gun during a firing exercise on the Cambodian border, injuring three people. Nigerian Army's VT-4 tanks also faced difficulties, requiring about 30 minutes to cool down the tank's guns between shots. In Kenya, VN-4 armored vehicles were found to be unable to withstand attacks from shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles. In the aviation sector, Jordan sold its Chinese-made CH-4B combat drone systems two years after purchasing them, and Algeria's CH-4B drones crashed during training flights. Iraq's drones were similarly grounded due to a lack of spare parts, rendering them unable to fly. The weaknesses are not limited to drones. The JF-17 fighter jets jointly produced by China and Pakistan were grounded in Myanmar in 2022 due to ongoing problems with radar and maintenance. Furthermore, during the Sindhu Operation, the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, Chinese-made KJL radars and surface-to-air missiles protecting Pakistani airbases were unable to detect and intercept Indian attacks. China's military-industrial