Myanmar’s junta is losing: Don’t hand it impunity disguised as ‘peace’

Guest contributor Khin Ohmar This month, foreign ministers from the 11-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASESAN) are reportedly going to meet with the rebranded junta’s new foreign minister, Tin Maung Swe. The meeting has been framed as a step toward dialogue. It is not. It is the normalization of a criminal entity, arriving precisely on schedule with war criminal Min Aung Hlaing’s own timetable. On April 20, two weeks after being sworn in as “president” through sham elections that the United Nations, ASEAN, and most of the democratic world rejected, Min Aung Hlaing announced his “100-day peace plan.” Armed resistance groups were invited to the table. The deadline: July 31. The terms for People’s Defense Forces: enter the “legal fold.” In other words: surrender. Negotiation with war criminals is not a path to peace For ethnic resistance organizations, the invitation was framed as dialogue, but structured around the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, a framework whose primary architect and sole enforcer is the same military that has shelled non-Bamar ethnic communities for decades and unilaterally broken every agreement it has ever signed. History has taught non-Bamar ethnic nationalities that every ceasefire agreement is followed by the military’s violent expansion into ethnic territories and systematic violence against ethnic communities—grabbing their ancestral land, robbing natural resources, and committing sexual violence against women. Some international actors argue that precisely because the junta is losing, this is the moment to push for a negotiated settlement. They believe that a weakened military is more likely to compromise than a victorious one. This argument gets the stakes exactly backwards. Negotiation with perpetrators of atrocity crimes is not a path to peace. It is impunity repackaged as diplomacy. An illegal and illegitimate military junta that has killed thousands, displaced millions, and bombed civilians does not become a legitimate peace partner by losing battles. The Karen National Union (KNU) rejected the plan immediately. So did the Chin National Front (CNF). So did the National Unity Government (NUG). These were not rejections born of inflexibility. They were rejections born of experience. Min Aung Hlaing is not a reliable narrator While Min Aung Hlaing was offering peace, his forces were dropping bombs. During his 2025 “Peace Forum,” the junta launched over 550 airstrikes, killing at least 471 civilians, including 72 children. Since his April “ceasefire” declaration, his forces have conducted at least 207 attacks, including 140 airstrikes, killing over 160 people. The pattern is consistent and documented. Today, more than 3.7 million people are internally displaced within Myanmar. Another 1.6 million have fled across its borders as refugees. In a single week in June, junta aircraft bombed residential areas in Kyauktaw, Rakhine State, killing at least 10 civilians. On the same day, a junta jet struck a village in Sagaing, killing five people including a pregnant woman. The military also bombed an IDP site in Mon State and dropped nearly 30 bombs on displacement sites in Karenni State. And yet, ASEAN’s member states have rushed to reward the junta’s staged performance. This is a coordinated diplomatic offensive Thailand’s foreign minister was first, arriving in Naypyidaw on April 21 and expressing open support for the rebranded junta’s re-entry into ASEAN representing the Myanmar state, even though it lacks both legal mandate and legitimacy. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Sugiono arrived in early June to a red-carpet welcome, calling Myanmar “an integral part of ASEAN” and reaffirming support for its peace process. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited the same week as the 100-day announcement, pledging continued support and coordination across the U.N., ASEAN, and Lancang-Mekong frameworks. India’s Prime Minister Modi hosted Min Aung Hlaing in New Delhi on 1 June. Laos’ Foreign Minister also visited Naypyidaw in June. Min Aung Hlaing has traveled to Vientiane July 3-5, his first official trip to an ASEAN member state since illegitimately seizing the presidency. This visit signals that it may become harder for the remaining holdouts within ASEAN to resist normalization with the junta. This same week, Myanmar’s authorities denied the ASEAN 2026 Chair, the Philippines’ Special Envoy, a request to meet Aung San Suu Kyi. Normalization proceeds. Concessions do not. These are not isolated bilateral gestures. This is a coordinated diplomatic offensive. And the July ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting with Tin Maung Swe is its next milestone. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister has been more careful in his framing. He has stated explicitly that his May visit to Naypyidaw did not constitute recognition of the rebranded junta, and that Malaysia’s engagement remains anchored to the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. His stated concern: if ASEAN steps back, a diplomatic vacuum forms that external powers will fill. This argument is understandable. But it is also precisely the logic that allows normalization to advance under cover of principle. When maintaining engagement becomes the goal in itself, the junta wins regardless of what conditions are nominally attached to it. It’s time to learn from past mistakes After the 2010 sham elections, many international governments moved quickly. They called it a transition. Sanctions were lifted. Investment flowed in. The military’s proxy party took power, and the world applauded the process. Ceasefire agreements were signed with ethnic resistance organizations. Peace donors poured money into the process, in some cases using development projects as direct incentives for signatures. The military signed, received the legitimacy and the resources, and then deployed its old playbook of divide and rule and violated every agreement it made. In February 2021, it came for the rest of the country. That sequence is now being repeated. The rebranding is different. The “president” title is new. The “100-day peace plan” is new. But the logic is identical: offer the appearance of process, extract international legitimacy, use the breathing room to reconsolidate. The military is not a reformed institution wearing a civilian suit. It is a collapsing institution seeking a diplomatic lifeline. The evidence of collapse is not speculation. The NUG’s Defense Ministry estimates that 44 percent of the country’s townships are now under revolutionary forces and ethnic resistance organizations. Another 24 per cent are active conflict zones. The military administers 32 per cent of the country, at most. This is not a government seeking peace from a position of stability. It is a junta attempting to buy time from a position of weakness. This is exactly the wrong moment for ASEAN to extend a hand. Every bilateral visit to Naypyidaw, every Foreign Ministers meeting granted to Tin Maung Swe, and every statement