Pacific Islands Forum Fractured by Great Power Rivalry

The 55th Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders' Meeting, which opened on August 31 in Palau, has exposed the reality that the competition for influence among major powers is casting a shadow over the framework of regional cooperation, contrary to the initially declared theme of "unity." Particularly, concerns are arising that the PIF's consensus-building mechanism may be exploited to reshape regional dynamics amid the intensifying competition for influence in the Pacific between China and the United States. Several key leaders were notably absent from this year's gathering. Leaders from Kiribati, Samoa, and Vanuatu sent deputies, while the Prime Minister of Fiji cited domestic affairs as the reason for his absence. An unprecedented situation also occurred with the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, who had to return mid-conference due to a no-confidence motion filed against him domestically. These absences raise questions about the PIF's solidarity. Kiribati's stance is particularly noteworthy. President Taneti Maamau dispatched not a cabinet minister but his director of foreign service, a former ambassador to China, as his representative. In an organization where decisions require consensus at the head of state level, sending a representative who cannot make final commitments is itself perceived as a political statement. Kiribati's posture becomes clearer against the backdrop of the missile crisis that preceded the summit. On July 6, China conducted a submarine-launched ballistic missile test in the Pacific, firing what Taiwan identified as a JL-2 from the South China Sea. The missile, carrying a dummy warhead, transited the exclusive economic zones of the Federated States of Micronesia, Naoero (formerly Nauru), and Kiribati before landing near Tuvalu’s maritime boundary. Beijing provided only a few hours’ notice to the affected Pacific Island nations. The reaction was swift – at least from those countries that did respond. Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister James Marape invoked the region’s traumatic history of nuclear testing, insisting that Pacific nations “do not want history repeated.” Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the test “provocative” and “destabilizing.” Yet when Pacific foreign ministers gathered in Fiji in early August, Kiribati and Naoero blocked the consensus needed to issue a joint condemnation. The PIF has historically operated on the principle of unanimity, a practice rooted in what Pacific leaders call the “Pacific Way,” designed to ensure that no island nation, however small, could be overruled by its larger neighbors. But the model assumed that external pressures would remain at the margins of PIF deliberations. When a member state with deep ties to the power responsible for a security event deploys its consensus rights to shield that power from collective criticism, the model risks becoming a means of undermining collective action. New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Winston Peters made the frustration explicit, noting that two countries “were seeking to use the need for consensus as a veto provision.” Peters said that he had “made it very clear that we didn’t think outsiders should be telling insiders” what positions to take. Kiribati’s alignment with Beijing extends beyond the blocking of a PIF statement. In late August, its parliament passed the first reading of a constitutional amendment that would restrict diplomatic recognition to states holding U.N. membership or permanent observer status, effectively locking future governments into recognizing Beijing. Graeme Smith of the Australian National University characterized the move as “almost entirely about sending a message to Beijing.” With that in mind, Taiwan’s return to the PIF may also have contributed to Kiribati’s lack of top-level representation. Last year, when the Solomon Islands hosted the 54th PIF Leaders’ Meeting, all external partners were excluded. The stated reason was a review of partnership arrangements, but the practical effect was to remove Taiwan from a gathering it had attended as a development partner since 1992. This year, with Palau – which has official diplomatic ties with Taiwan – as host, the dynamics reversed. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung arrived in Koror leading a delegation that included representatives from energy, technology, construction, and agriculture, and he met with Whipps, Palau’s president, to strengthen bilateral ties before participating in the Taiwan/Republic of China-Forum Countries Dialogue. Only three PIF members still maintain formal ties with Taipei, but Taiwan’s development programs extend well beyond those allies. Just in July 2026, Taiwan donated $2 million to the Forum Secretariat and in 2025 it pledged $3 million to the Pacific Resilience Facility. Beijing, however, doesn’t take kindly to Taiwan’s inclusion in any form. China’s special envoy Qian Bo confronted Whipps directly at the Forum Troika meeting in Fiji, demanding Taiwan’s exclusion and warning that Beijing would “have to retaliate.” He dismissed Palau as “a small country.” Whipps was unfazed: “It doesn’t matter. We’re a country.” He later characterized Qian’s conduct as inappropriate, remarking that “if you want somebody to love you, usually you come with chocolates and nice cards.” China made good on Qian’s threat on August 19, when Beijing’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism issued a travel advisory for Palau, warning of alleged theft and dangerous marine conditions and portraying one of the Pacific’s safest destinations as a place to avoid. The U.S. Embassy rejected the advisory, stating that “the United States opposes any attempts by China to weaponize tourism to coerce Palau.” Tourism accounts for roughly 40 percent of Palau’s gross domestic product, and Beijing has used this lever before. After Palau refused to break ties with Taiwan, China banned package tours in 2017 and visitor numbers collapsed, but the country absorbed the shock and the weapon’s effectiveness has diminished with repeated use. Source: The Diplomat Indonesia