Rohingya Repatriation Stalled After Nine Years: Myanmar's Internal Issues Remain Key

Read The Diplomat, Know The Asia-Pacific An analysis of the political, legal, security, and geopolitical dimensions of the Rohingya crisis. Newly arrived Rohingya refugees wait in line at a refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, hoping to receive assistance from humanitarian aid groups, Feb. 25, 2025. Nearly nine years after the 2017 military crackdown that forced more than 750,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh, the prospect of their repatriation to Myanmar remains as distant as ever. Bangladesh recently took an important institutional step by establishing a national committee to strengthen coordination and develop a comprehensive strategy for the safe, voluntary, and sustainable return of the Rohingya. The initiative reflects Dhaka’s continued commitment to resolving one of the world’s most protracted refugee crises, after hosting more than 1.2 million Rohingya for nearly a decade. The committee deserves recognition, but better coordination within Bangladesh alone cannot resolve a crisis the roots of which lie across the border. Rohingya repatriation is not primarily a logistical or humanitarian challenge. It is a political, legal, security, judicial, and geopolitical problem that demands structural change inside Myanmar and sustained international engagement. Until the conditions that drove the Rohingya from their homes are fundamentally addressed, large-scale return will remain unattainable. The first and most essential requirement is the restoration of citizenship. Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law effectively rendered the Rohingya stateless, stripping them of legal recognition and the rights associated with nationality. Citizenship is the foundation of freedom of movement, political participation, access to education and healthcare, property ownership, and equal protection under the law. Returning Rohingya refugees to Myanmar as stateless people, without restoring these rights, would simply recreate the conditions that enabled their persecution in the first place. Security is equally indispensable. Since the 2021 military coup, Rakhine State has become a fragmented conflict zone divided between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army. This raises questions that no repatriation plan has adequately answered. Who will guarantee the safety of returning refugees? Who will issue citizenship documents and administer civilian institutions? Who will investigate human rights violations if they recur? Without credible and independently verifiable guarantees from either party, repatriation cannot be considered safe or sustainable. Justice is another indispensable pillar of any durable solution. The atrocities committed against the Rohingya, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and decades of systematic discrimination, cannot simply be set aside in pursuit of political expediency. Accountability is not separate from repatriation; it is one of the conditions that makes repatriation possible. Without justice, trust cannot be rebuilt, and the structural drivers of persecution are likely to persist. Equally important is the restoration of homes, land, and livelihoods. Thousands of Rohingya villages have been destroyed or occupied, leaving many refugees with nowhere to return. A meaningful return requires restitution or fair compensation, together with access to housing, education, healthcare, and sustainable livelihoods. Repatriation should enable refugees to rebuild dignified lives rather than merely cross an international border. Finally, the Rohingya themselves must be at the center of any decision about their future. For too long, discussions have been dominated by governments and international organizations while the voices of refugees have remained marginal. Any repatriation process must be voluntary, informed, and based on genuine consent, free from coercion, political pressure, or declining humanitarian assistance. Yet even if these conditions are widely recognized, they remain difficult to achieve because of the geopolitical realities surrounding Myanmar. China remains Myanmar’s most influential international partner, and Rakhine State occupies an important position in the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor under the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has repeatedly facilitated dialogue between Bangladesh and Myanmar and promoted repatriation frameworks, but none has produced meaningful progress. China’s overriding priority is regional stability and the protection of strategic infrastructure, including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and energy corridors connecting the Indian Ocean with Yunnan Province. Consequently, Beijing has shown little willingness to exert sustained pressure on Myanmar over citizenship, accountability, or ethnic rights, while its position at the United Nations Security Council has frequently shielded Myanmar from stronger international action. India’s approach has been shaped by similar strategic calculations. Its Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which links Kolkata to Rakhine State’s Sittwe Port via India’s northeastern states, passes through territory increasingly controlled by the Arakan Army. As fighting has reshaped the political landscape in Rakhine, New Delhi has reportedly engaged with the Arakan Army to protect this vital connectivity project despite growing allegations of abuses against Rohingya civilians. Like China, India has prioritized regional stability, border security, and infrastructure over sustained pressure for structural reforms that would enable the Rohingya to return safely. Although China and India compete for influence across Myanmar and Bangladesh, neither has consistently used its leverage to advance Rohingya rights. Instead, both have largely treated the crisis through the lens of strategic competition, economic connectivity, and regional security. This convergence has left Bangladesh with limited diplomatic leverage despite bearing the greatest part of the humanitarian burden. Regional institutions have likewise struggled to respond effectively. ASEAN remains constrained by its long-standing principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Despite diplomatic initiatives and repeated statements, the organization has been unable to generate meaningful pressure capable of changing realities inside Myanmar. By contrast, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has pursued one of the most significant legal responses to the crisis. Acting with the support of the OIC, The Gambia filed proceedings against Myanmar before the International Court of Justice in 2019, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Court continues to investigate alleged crimes involving the forced deportation of the Rohingya into Bangladesh. These legal processes represent important steps toward accountability, but they move slowly and have yet to produce changes that improve conditions for refugees contemplating return. While diplomacy and litigation c