Cambodia Accuses Thailand of Scuttling Maritime Talks, Opts for UNCLOS Path

Cambodia has refuted claims by Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow that it closed the door to bilateral maritime negotiations by turning to compulsory conciliation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Cambodia asserts that the facts are reversed, and it was Thailand that closed the door by unilaterally terminating the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the sole mutually agreed bilateral framework for addressing overlapping maritime claims. Cambodia argues that Thailand cannot destroy the negotiating framework and then blame Cambodia for the lack of negotiations under it. For 25 years, the 2001 MOU provided the agreed basis for discussions on maritime delimitation and potential cooperation over resources in the overlapping claims area. Cambodia maintains it did not withdraw from this framework; Thailand did. While Thailand suggests direct talks could still continue without the MOU, Cambodia counters that an informal invitation to negotiate under new or undefined conditions is not equivalent to a jointly agreed framework. A genuine bilateral mechanism, it argues, requires agreement from both parties on its legal basis, scope, procedures, and continuity. By terminating the 2001 MOU, Thailand removed that common foundation. Cambodia states it cannot be expected to place its sovereign rights and long-term maritime interests within a process that Thailand can redesign, suspend, or terminate based on its domestic political calculations. Furthermore, Cambodia clarifies that UNCLOS conciliation is not a rejection of negotiation but rather negotiation supported by law. The conciliation commission hears both sides and proposes terms for settlement, with recommendations being non-binding unless accepted. Thailand itself has acknowledged the process is non-binding and can serve as a basis for further negotiations, making its claim that Cambodia rejected dialogue untenable. Cambodia positions its choice as one of rules over uncertainty, law over pressure, and conciliation over confrontation. It also refutes Thailand's attempt to link the maritime process with the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC), which concerns the land boundary under a separate 2000 MOU. These are distinct disputes governed by different legal instruments and mechanisms. There is no contradiction in Cambodia supporting the JBC for land demarcation while pursuing UNCLOS for maritime delimitation. The contradiction, Cambodia argues, lies in Thailand demanding bilateralism while simultaneously terminating one bilateral framework and delaying another. Thailand's assertion that its door remains open, yet it also states JBC talks cannot proceed without unspecified security and confidence-building conditions, is seen by Cambodia as keeping the key to a door it claims is open. If Thailand truly supports negotiation, it should participate in the UNCLOS process in good faith, resume JBC meetings without unrelated preconditions, and cease shifting responsibility for the impasse onto Cambodia. In conclusion, Cambodia asserts that the facts clearly show Thailand terminated the 2001 MOU, prompting Cambodia to seek another peaceful and lawful mechanism. By invoking UNCLOS, Cambodia has opened a new door grounded in international law, guided by neutral conciliators, and directed toward an equitable and mutually acceptable settlement, urging Thailand to walk through it in good faith.