Practicality should drive Thai regional policy vis-à-vis Myanmar

When looking at Myanmar, the current cross-border dynamics in play require Thailand to adopt a new, and leading, approach toward Myanmar compared with that previously employed by the Kingdom with respect to its troubled western neighbor. It should be a regional approach void of ideology and instead focused on the practical needs of Thailand and other international actors. This, in essence, is the gist behind a recently co-published paper by Don Pathan and Supalak Ganjanakhundee entitled Rethinking Thailand’s Strategic Posture toward Myanmar. According to the authors, the necessity of this policy shift is a result of the fallout from the 2021 coup in Myanmar and the ensuing nationwide uprising. No longer are the ills of Myanmar contained within its national borders. Rather, Myanmar’s crisis has evolved “into a multidimensional regional security challenge affecting border security, transnational crime, humanitarian conditions, public health, environmental governance, and regional connectivity.” The article itself takes a highly realist approach in prescribing for Thailand its assessed best path forward. The authors do not envision the conflict in Myanmar being resolved any time soon. And, as such, Thailand should desist from trying to “influence Myanmar’s internal political trajectory,” instead focusing on “protecting Thailand’s own national interests while contributing to regional stability.” Some might ask, ‘Why should Thailand take on the task of serving as an operational hub and regional risk manager’? Quite simply, it is deemed a matter of comparative advantage. Pathan and Ganjanakhundee argue that Thailand’s unique “geographic position and stake in the outcome uniquely qualify it to…play a coordinating role: convening relevant actors, facilitating information sharing, proposing and hosting mechanisms for specific functional cooperation, and providing a platform through which the international community can engage with the Myanmar crisis constructively.” Specifically, the authors urge Thailand to adopt a three-layered strategic approach. The first layer being a focus on strengthening regional cooperation, with ASEAN still to play a central role. But the argument follows that the role of ASEAN needs to be supplemented with a more multi-faceted regional approach to addressing the cross-border fallout from the 2021 Myanmar coup, envisioning a more active role for the broader region’s alphabet soup of groupings (BIMSTEC, LMC, MRC, etc.). The second layer, according to the paper, “broadens Thailand’s bilateral partnerships to mobilize influence, technical expertise, and development resources that regional organizations alone cannot provide.” In approaching this layer of overlapping bilateral partnerships, Pathan and Ganjanakhundee acknowledge that it can be a challenge – some may argue a major one at that – to work with all parties, as priorities and common interests are not always shared. Speaking to the challenge of getting all the disparate stakeholders on the same page, the paper concludes that “The Western partners present Thailand with the most diplomatically complex management challenge in the bilateral landscape. Their policy frameworks on Myanmar — built around sanctions, accountability, democracy promotion, and support for the resistance movement — are structurally in tension with Thailand’s functional engagement approach.” Building on this line of thinking, “The primary risk in US engagement,” as identified by the authors, “is the anti-China containment framing that US strategic communication consistently applies to Southeast Asian partnerships. US officials will seek to frame Thailand’s coordinating role as part of a broader democratic coalition or Indo- Pacific partnership that implicitly positions Thailand against China.” Meanwhile, the third layer of the strategic approach is arguably the most straight forward. It focuses on implementation within Thailand and incorporates tackling such issues as “cyber scam networks, transnational organised crime, border health security, environmental pollution affecting shared river systems, humanitarian preparedness, and disruptions to regional connectivity.” As for the subject of conflict resolution with respect to Myanmar’s ongoing multi-faceted civil war, mention is made of making conditions more favorable for an internal solution, though details are scarce. Make no mistake, this is not a blueprint for addressing Myanmar’s internal ills, let alone realizing the hoped-for federal democracy of so many. The paper does not argue for any intervention influencing Myanmar’s internal politics; while urging everyone not to misinterpret the mandate of a regional bloc such as ASEAN, a body whose central role in dealing with Myanmar the study is quick to uphold. Concerning ASEAN, Pathan and Ganjanakhundee are adamant in that the regional grouping is not designed to impose a political settlement. So, what kind of political solution for Myanmar does the paper imply?