Will Taiwan Fight? Better Evidence Needed.

The question of whether Taiwan will fight or simply "give up" in the face of increasing pressure from China has sparked considerable debate. However, some analyses addressing this question are pointed out to be lacking in solid evidence. Simon Shuster's article in The Atlantic attracted attention for posing uncomfortable questions often avoided in discussions about Taiwan's security. Yet, criticisms have been raised by Taiwanese legislators and foreign analysts based in Taiwan, citing factual errors, misinterpretations of political context, and a selective portrayal of Taiwanese society. Specifically, a legislator interviewed publicly criticized the distortion of his comments, and Taiwan's National Security Council also issued a statement rejecting the article's premise. These criticisms focus on the perceived lack of understanding of Taiwan's domestic politics and society, insufficient engagement with Taiwanese voices, and the downplaying of public opinion polls indicating considerable willingness among Taiwanese to defend their island. However, these counterarguments have not yet provided a definitive answer regarding Taiwan's actual response to a Chinese attack. While opinion polls are useful for understanding public attitudes, stating one would defend Taiwan in a survey differs greatly from making that decision under actual combat conditions, with falling missiles, mounting casualties, and disrupted communications. Similarly, past successes like democratization movements and the response to COVID-19 suggest Taiwan's society has the capacity for mobilization, but it remains unclear how this translates to responding to a direct military invasion. Israel's experience illustrates the difficulty of prediction. While it has shown remarkable mobilization against military threats, it struggled with public compliance with restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. This indicates that societal responses are influenced by numerous factors, including the type of threat, its perceived severity, public trust, political divisions, and personal costs. Therefore, instead of endlessly asking whether Taiwan will fight, it is more pertinent to examine what Taiwan's society, politicians, and military are concretely doing in response to the growing threat from China. Currently, challenges persist, including personnel shortages in military recruitment and retention, insufficient training for reservists, delays in defense budget allocations due to inter-party disputes, and slow reforms. However, positive signs have emerged in recent years, such as improvements in military recruitment and retention, increased participation in civil defense training by citizens, substantial increases in defense spending, and more realistic and comprehensive annual military exercises like "Han Kuang." These developments do not guarantee that Taiwanese citizens will fight, but they provide clues for a deeper analysis. Key indicators for Taiwan's future security will include the number of military recruits and their retention rates, the quality of reservist training, citizens' willingness to invest time in civil defense, and whether political leaders can prioritize defense above partisan interests.