Rebuffing the junta: Europe must seriously engage with the Myanmar resistance

Mizzima Commentary Putting a face on the Myanmar resistance is a tough call. There are a myriad names – from exiled Myanmar politicians to People’s Defence Force fighters to ethnic armed organization commanders. Yet there is no recognizable Che Guevara, Mao Zedong or Ahmad Shah Massoud. Aung San Suu Kyi is a symbol of freedom, for sure, but she remains unseen, and contrary to the Myanmar resistance’s call for war, analysts assume she still takes Mahatma Gandhi’s pacifist line. This prompts the question: When European diplomats and government leaders seek to engage with the Myanmar resistance, who should they deal with? This dilemma is becoming more and more obvious as Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s battle for legitimacy intensifies, and amidst the moves of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to edge cautiously towards a deal. The Myanmar civil war is Asia’s deadliest conflict, sparked by Min Aung Hlaing’s military coup in 2021 – and any amount of posturing cannot deflect from the fact that he is responsiblefor the bloodshed. THE GAMES THE LEADER PLAYS While the former commander-in-chief of the Myanmar armed forces has been called a lot of names – one thing is for certain, he is shrewd. Since engineering his way into the role of “president” following a “sham election” held six months ago, Min Aung Hlaing has changed his clothes from green to white and is seeking regional and international legitimacy. His recent high-profile visits to India and China have helped cement his position. And last weekend, ASEAN’s acceptance of his foreign minister, Tim Maung Swe, at an “informal” foreign ministers meeting in Bangkok appeared to provide one further step by the junta towards returning to the fold. But not so fast. ASEAN is torn between a more pragmatic approach to the Myanmar junta and keeping the doors locked. As Ma Theresa Lazaro, Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar, explained, in the talks with the Myanmar foreign minister they were able to have “candid and constructive discussion on implementing the 5-Point Consensus and how ASEAN may assist Myanmar in normalizing its relations with ASEAN.” This meeting is significant as this is the first time that ASEAN Foreign Ministers had an in-person engagement with the Myanmar counterpart since 2021, as mandated by the Leaders during the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, reports the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs. “The Special Envoy reiterated that Myanmar remains an integral part of ASEAN.” On 13 July, the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar engaged with Myanmar ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), as well as representatives of the junta-aligned National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) to discuss the way forward on the inclusive national political dialogue between and among parties in Myanmar. All sides expressed openness to the dialogue process and emphasized the importance of constructive dialogue and ensuring careful preparation of all parties involved, reports the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs. Lazaro went on to hold online talks with the National Unity Government (NUG). An official from an NUG ministry told Mizzima: “We met online very briefly. She did not raise anything significant. The NUG conveyed its stance in accordance with our official statements.” The opposition Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) has been at pains to point out that this recent meeting with ASEAN representatives does not signal the commencement of formal political dialogue or negotiations with the military junta. The statement clarified that SCEF members held a private discussion solely at the invitation of the ASEAN Special Envoy, the Philippine Foreign Minister, and the Thai Foreign Minister, and did not meet jointly with junta representatives. During the meeting, the SCEF emphasized to ASEAN representatives that the ground realities in Myanmar have fundamentally shifted. “Governance in Myanmar is no longer centralized in Naypyidaw. In vast areas of the country, local revolutionary authorities have assumed executive, judicial, and public security responsibilities on a state and unit-by-unit basis,” the SCEF stated. Consequently, the SCEF warned ASEAN that any peace process must recognize and engage these legitimate ground authorities, cautioning that premature attempts to normalize relations will only worsen the current crisis. Don’t ignore the representatives of the Spring Revolution. THE DILEMMA So how should the European states handle the Myanmar crisis, given a moment of strategic reckoning on Myanmar appears to be upon us, if international analysts are to be believed? Europe, after all, is part of the Western world that has stood up for the Myanmar people. The challenge is two-pronged. Firstly, diplomacy. There appears to be a slow but growing acceptance by ASEAN that the blood-soaked Myanmar leader has to be dealt with, in line with his hefty allies China, India, and Russia, with the hope that the civil war can be damped down and a more humanitarian approach can be taken. ASEAN is tired of having to deal with this “black sheep” in the family, and is seeking to get thejunta to adhere to their 5-Point Consensus – an agreement barely on life-support. Myanmar leader Min Aung Hlaing is seeking legitimacy for his illegal rule and hopes the results of his election provides a fig-leaf of acceptance, backed by powerful neighbours China and India. Secondly, warfare. Analysts recognize that things are not going well for the Spring Revolution resistance. “Myanmar’s armed forces — known as the Tatmadaw — are on a steady roll of countrywide advances that have thrown the opposition onto the defensive,” according to security analyst Anthony Davis, writing for Asia Times. “This has nothing to do with the strategic acuity of new Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief General YeWin Oo, a soldier whose elevation stems from his unblinking loyalty to Min Aung Hlaing and, after years as national intelligence chief, a grasp of political undercurrents in the army and across society more broadly. “It has everything to do with a methodically unfolding strategy that began in the dry season of early 2025, was sustained through the mid-year rains and continues today,” Davis writes. “The long-term campaign, which Ye Win Oo is now overseeing rather than planning, is aimed in the medium term at reasserting control over key economic centers and border trade hubs lost in the serial disasters of late 2023 and mid-2024to the so-called ‘Operation 10.27.’” Other analysts recognize that given this war of attrition is slowly turning the tables on the Myanmar opposition, the resistance have to get their act together quickly on the battlefield and on the diplomatic front. PUTTING A FACE ON THE REVOLUTION Myanmar resistance supporters such as the European nations need to do more to bolster the battle against the junta – beyond sanc