India's Delays Lead to Key Bangladeshi Projects Handed to China

Read The Diplomat, Know The Asia-Pacific In 2015, Bangladesh allotted land to India for the development of an SEZ at Mongla port. India failed to start work on that project. Dhaka handed it to China. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at a bilateral meeting held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, June 26, 2026. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China on June 22-26 saw the two sides sign 17 bilateral instruments. The two governments elevated “their comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership to jointly build a China-Bangladesh community with a shared future,” agreed to explore a 2+2 dialogue mechanism involving diplomacy and defense, and announced plans to implement a Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Two projects, in particular — the Mongla Port Facilities Modernization and Expansion Project and the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) — announced during Rahman’s visit have India worried as China’s involvement in these projects has implications for India’s national security. Mongla Port, Bangladesh’s second-largest and second-busiest seaport after Chattogram, is located on the east bank of the Pasur River, 71 nautical miles upstream from the Bay of Bengal. The project here involves developing a special economic zone (SEZ) on a 110-acre plot of land adjacent to the port. China’s state-owned Civil Engineering Construction Corporation will develop the SEZ and has proposed an investment of $650 million in manufacturing industries, warehouses and storage facilities at the SEZ. India’s concern over China’s involvement in the Mongla port SEZ is its location. It is just 80 km from the Indian border and 188 km from Kolkata. According to a CNN-News18 report, which cited Indian intelligence sources, there is a “high risk of Beijing installing advanced maritime surveillance systems and electronic intelligence infrastructure at the site.” It will enable China to monitor from close quarters “Indian naval deployments, coastal radar networks, and strategic movements around the Kolkata and Haldia ports.” Additionally, it would provide Beijing with access to yet another Bay of Bengal port, which could, in turn, increase China’s presence in the Indian Ocean. As for the TRCMRP, this is a river engineering initiative that involves dredging the Teesta and developing reclaimed land. With Chinese expertise, Bangladesh will be able to manage the Teesta’s waters better and deal with water shortages, floods, and riverbank erosion. India’s problem with the TRCMRP is its location. Although it is on the Bangladeshi side of the border, the proposed river management project is near India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor, a narrow sliver of land that links the Indian mainland with the restive Northeast. India’s concern over China’s involvement in the Mongla port SEZ and the TRCMRP is understandable to some extent given their proximity to the Indian border. However, these are far from the first projects China has executed in Bangladesh. China’s role and presence in Bangladesh have grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades. It has been involved in scores of infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, including the building of roads, bridges, and railway lines. Indeed, the Chinese are already engaged in building roads, bridges, and power plants in Rangpur division, Bangladesh’s northernmost district that borders the Siliguri corridor, and where much of the TRCMRP’s work will be focused. Dhaka’s decision to hand over the TRCMRP and the Mongla SEZ project to China may be part of “a broader policy shift to reroute regional transit dependency away from Indian networks.” However, India has only itself to blame for these projects being handed to the Chinese. Consider this: Bangladesh first offered India the project to develop an SEZ at Mongla port. Under a 2015 agreement with India, it allotted 110 acres of land for the SEZ. Subsequently, the Indian government appointed Indian developer Hiranandani Group’s subsidiary, Evita Constructions, to develop the SEZ. However, the project never took off. Finally, in October 2025, amid deteriorating Bangladesh-India relations, the interim administration under Muhammad Yunus delisted the project because the developer had failed to commence work. India’s implementation of projects abroad has a long history of not meeting deadlines. This habit cost it the Mongla SEZ. As for the TRCMRP, Bangladesh may not have turned to the Chinese to help manage the Teesta’s waters had India not dragged its feet on an agreement on sharing the waters of this river. Although the deal was ready by 2011, objections from the West Bengal government prevented New Delhi from signing the agreement with Dhaka. Frustrated with Delhi’s failure to deliver an agreement, in 2016, Dhaka began exploring the China option for better management of the Teesta river within Bangladesh’s borders. Pressure from Delhi kept Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina from sealing a deal with the Chinese on the Teesta project. While India did, in May 2024, offer to finance the $1 billion project to dredge and manage the Teesta inside Bangladesh, it came too late. In August, Hasina was ousted from power, clearing the way for the interim government to ask China for help in managing the Teesta. If China has made deep inroads in India’s neighboring countries, this must be attributed not just to its financial clout but also its efficient and swift execution of infrastructure projects. Importantly, it has not hesitated to snap up projects with strategic value, even if these are not economically profitable. India has often dithered on such projects. Take the Hambantota port, for example. The Sri Lankan government first offered India the opportunity to develop the Hambantota port. India turned down the offer because it felt the port would not attract enough traffic. While Delhi may have been right in its assessment of the port’s capacity to draw business, its prioritization of the port’s short-term economic potential over the long-term strategic value proved costly. After stepping in to develop Hambantota port, China took over port operations in 2017 under a 99-year lease, when Sri Lanka failed to pay back loans. India’s loss was China’s gain. Geography, history, and a shared culture gave India a head start in building strong bonds with Bangladesh. However, India has frittered away these advantages, especially since the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power nationally in 2014. The BJP government routinely demeans Bangladeshis not just in its rhetoric — Home Minister Amit Shah likened Bangladeshi immigrants to termites — but in its policies and actions as well. The ongoing “push back” of what Delhi terms as “illegal” or “undocumented Bangladeshi immigrants” has fueled anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh to unprecedented levels. At stake are not just a few projects or