Vietnam Denies Great Power Interference in Indochina, Pursues Influence Strategy

During the Q&A following his address at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, Vietnam's President To Lam stated that Vietnam has no intention of becoming a "center of power" in Southeast Asia. This commitment contrasts with Vietnam's historical attempts to lead an Indochinese bloc comprising Laos and Cambodia against ASEAN during the Cold War. Vietnam now affirms its "Four Nos" foreign policy (no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no letting foreign powers set up military bases in Vietnam or use Vietnamese territory against another, no use or threat of use of force in international relations) and advocates for "ASEAN centrality." This statement is noteworthy given China's growing presence in Laos and Cambodia. Modern Vietnam has perceived its two western neighbors as part of its sphere of influence since 1945 and is concerned about the possibility of a China-dominated Laos and Cambodia. However, Vietnam has renounced the use of force to maintain influence and aims to do so without being perceived as a regional hegemon. For Vietnam, nurturing friendly governments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh is crucial for maintaining stability on its "western front." Laos and Cambodia could serve as staging grounds for great powers to attack Vietnam, which lacks horizontal strategic depth along its 3,400-kilometer border with the two nations. Uncertainty about Lao and Cambodian intentions could necessitate the constant deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops. Vietnam's strategy toward Laos and Cambodia throughout the Indochina Wars reflects its determination to keep its western flank free of foreign influence by manipulating who ruled these countries. During the First Indochina War (1946-1954), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) waged a war of independence against France not only within Vietnam's territory but also throughout the rest of Indochina. This was due to geographical necessity, as Hanoi feared France-backed regimes in Laos and Cambodia would threaten its fledgling communist government. The DRV created communist sister states in Laos and Cambodia to contest against the royalist governments there. The western flank was so important that the Vietnamese communist leadership decided to concentrate their forces on Dien Bien Phu instead of the Red River Delta. This was to open a Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia front to force France to spread its forces thin throughout Indochina – the exact disadvantage that the French wanted to avoid. With Chinese support, the DRV succeeded in neutralizing Laos and Cambodia from French control under the 1954 Geneva Agreements. However, it failed to win international recognition for the Cambodian communists and obtained only limited recognition for the Pathet Lao. This is where Hanoi's geographical pragmatism trumped its ideological commitment to its Lao and Cambodian comrades. After Geneva, the DRV was willing to peacefully coexist with the royalist governments in Laos and Cambodia and restrained Lao and Cambodian communists from waging revolutions so long as the royalist governments abided by the Geneva Accords by not joining military alliances. Such tolerance soon expired at the onset of the Second Indochina War (1955-1975). This time, the DRV perceived that the United States was trying to undermine Lao and Cambodian neutrality by sponsoring pro-U.S. groups in their respective governments and putting them under the protection of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. In May 1959, rightist elements excluded the Pathet Lao from the neutral Royal Lao Government (RLG). This prompted Hanoi to increase its military support to the Pathet Lao to resist the RLG. The 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos did not change Hanoi's course. As the war against the U.S.-backed Saigon government intensified, the DRV needed a friendly Lao government to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail and crack down on cross-border commando insertions into its territory, and the RLG could not meet that demand. The same goes with Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Cambodia. Hanoi was willing to tolerate his government and limited support for the Cambodian communists so long as Sihanouk was letting DRV troops set up camps and use Cambodian territory to launch attacks against U.S.-backed South Vietnam. However, after the pro-U.S. General Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk in March 1970, Hanoi ramped up its military support to the Cambodian communists who were waging war on Lon Nol. With Chinese and Soviet backing, the DRV successfully forced the United States to withdraw from Indochina in January 1973, which brought the Lao and Cambodian communists into power in 1975. Hanoi thought that its western flank was finally stabilized. The Third Indochina War (1978-1991) once again showed how determined Vietnam was to keep its western flank free of foreign powers by nurturing friendly Cambodian and Lao governments. Soon after taking power in Cambodia in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge came to pose a new threat to unified Vietnam's southwestern front. Vietnam tried to negotiate territorial disputes with it, but all attempts failed. However, what worried Vietnam was not the Khmer Rouge's military power but its Chinese backer. Vietnam could have overthrown the Khmer Rouge in late 1977, but it decided to only launch limited counteroffensives then, so as not to upset China. However, Chinese military advisors' presence in Cambodia and their role in arming and planning attacks against Vietnam after serious Vietnam-China border clashes in late 1978 prompted Vietnam to invade Cambodia in December 1978 and overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime, installing a pro-Vietnamese government. This action, supported by the Soviet Union, led to widespread international condemnation and a period of prolonged conflict and regional instability. In the modern era, Vietnam appears to be pursuing a strategy of maintaining its influence in Laos and Cambodia through economic cooperation and diplomacy, countering Chinese influence while ensuring its own security, rather than through military force.