Pakistan's New Province Debate: Navigating Power Dispersion and Regional Diversity

Read The Diplomat, Know The Asia-Pacific The real question is not simply how many provinces Pakistan needs, but whether its political system can make smaller units more accountable, representative and effective. Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi has stirred debate in the country over the question of carving out new provinces. “The system we are living under has collapsed,” he said in July. “The only solution is to take [the matter of] administrative units, provinces or whatever you may call it, to the public.” Others have spoken on the matter as well. While Defense Minister Khawaja Asif has called for greater decentralization and devolution of power to the grassroots, the director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, pointed to Pakistan’s dramatic population growth even as the country continues to operate with only four provinces. He added that any administrative “reset” should be undertaken through constitutional methods, legal procedures, and political representatives. The timing and personalities involved make the debate politically significant. It touches on Pakistan’s military-civilian relationship, its hybrid political system, inter-provincial relations and the historical forces that have shaped the country. Naqvi is often seen as a figure with close ties with the military establishment — the latter is perceived as central to his political rise. Given his political trajectory and the military establishment’s immediate and subtle reinforcement of his statement, it is widely believed that the military is broadly sympathetic to, if not supportive of, the position that Naqvi articulated. Proposals have ranged from around a dozen units to as many as three dozen. However, the question is not simply whether Pakistan has too few provinces, but whether its administrative map adequately reflects its demographic, linguistic, and regional diversity. Supporters of new provinces point to Pakistan’s poor social development indicators. With a population of around 250 million, a literacy rate of only 63 percent, some 28 million children out of school and widespread child stunting, the argument for more decentralized and accountable governance is compelling. Smaller administrative units, advocates argue, could bring decision-making closer to citizens and improve the delivery of education, health, and other basic services. Pakistan’s provinces are highly unequal in population, geography, and administrative complexity. Punjab alone has more than half the country’s population, while Balochistan is much larger geographically but sparsely populated. A provincial government in Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, or Quetta inevitably faces difficulties administering remote and diverse regions. The demand for a separate South Punjab province illustrates this problem. Southern districts have long complained that political and administrative power is concentrated in Lahore and central Punjab. Yet creating new provinces could also have explosive political consequences, particularly in Sindh. Any proposal involving Karachi would reopen sensitive questions of ethnicity and political power. The 2023 census put Karachi Division’s population at about 20.4 million. It is a deeply multi-ethnic city, with Urdu, Pashto, Sindhi, Punjabi, Baloch, and other communities living there. The violence that engulfed Karachi in the 1990s, particularly amid confrontations involving the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, which claimed to represent the Mohajirs, and the state and rival ethnic and political groups, remains embedded in the city’s political consciousness. For this reason, redrawing Sindh’s boundaries would not be viewed simply as administrative reform. It could become a struggle over ethnic identity, resources, and control of Pakistan’s economic center. Demonstrations against new provinces have consequently often been framed as resistance to attempts to alter Sindh’s political balance. There is also a formidable constitutional obstacle. Under Article 239(4) of Pakistan’s Constitution, an amendment altering the limits of a province cannot be presented to the president for assent unless it has first been approved by that province’s assembly by at least a two-thirds majority. Constitutional amendments also require two-thirds majorities in both houses of parliament. This makes provincial reorganization fundamentally different from ordinary administrative boundary changes. A provincial assembly would effectively be asked to approve a reduction in its own territory, political influence, and potentially its share of resources. In Sindh, where the Pakistan People’s Party derives much of its political strength, such consent would be particularly difficult. Some proposals, however, have a stronger institutional foundation. The demand for a separate Hazara province has been endorsed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, while proposals for a Saraiki-speaking province in southern Punjab have received support in Punjab and the National Assembly. Neither has been implemented. Disagreements over boundaries, political interests, and the required constitutional majority have repeatedly stalled them. Pakistan’s history also explains the suspicion surrounding attempts to redraw its map. The 1955 One-Unit scheme merged the provinces and princely states of West Pakistan into a single province, partly to create parity with East Pakistan (subsequently Bangladesh). The arrangement was abolished in 1970. The political crisis surrounding the 1970 election and the subsequent breakup of Pakistan left a lasting sensitivity about administrative arrangements being used to manipulate political representation. Creating a new province does not necessarily bring the government closer to citizens. A new provincial capital can simply become another distant center of power. If the objective is better garbage collection, policing, schools, hospitals, municipal planning, and roads, the relevant institution may be a city or district government rather than a provincial government. This is particularly important after the 18th Amendment, which devolved substantial powers to the provinces while local governments have often remained politically and financially weak. Decentralization without accountability can simply replace distant elites with new local elites. The debate over Pakistan’s provinces raises fundamental questions about federalism, representation, fiscal distribution, regional identity, and the balance between the federation, provinces, and local governments. It also has a wider South Asian dimension. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other countries in the region share many challenges in managing linguistic, ethnic, and regional diversity. India’s experience with state reorganization on linguistic lines, Bangladesh’s experiments with administrative decentralization, and Pakistan’s own history of provincial and local governance offer valuable comparative lessons. Unfortunately, decades of