Thailand, the Next-Door Neighbor: An Icebreaker or a Rank-Breaker for ASEAN?

Nicholas Kong Thailand and Myanmar share a long, complex, and often ambivalent history. Their relationship has been shaped by centuries of rivalry and territorial conflict, but also by economic interdependence, shared security concerns, and unusually close ties between their military institutions. Today, Thailand, Myanmar’s next-door neighbor in the ASEAN family, is arguably its most consequential interlocutor. As an ASEAN founding member, Bangkok therefore occupies a unique position: it can serve as an icebreaker between Myanmar and ASEAN or, if bilateral interests take precedence over collective commitments, risk becoming a rank-breaker within the bloc. A Multi-Dimensional Relationship For more than five centuries, Thailand-Myanmar relations have evolved across three overlapping dimensions: traditional state-to-state security, economic interdependence, and non-traditional security challenges. The Burmese Toungoo and Konbaung kingdoms invaded Siam several times from the sixteenth century until the Anglo-Burmese wars culminated in the British annexation of Burma in 1885, while Siam remained an independent buffer state. After Burma gained independence in 1948, civil war and ethnic insurgencies emerged along the Thai border, making border security and informal trade central to bilateral relations. Following General Ne Win’s 1962 coup, the military dominated political and economic life, and Myanmar descended into one of the world’s least developed countries, while Thailand emerged as one of Southeast Asia’s rising economies. Cross-border smuggling expanded, while the Golden Triangle became a major center of the global opium trade. After Myanmar’s 1988 political upheaval and military coup, refugee flows, undocumented migration, and human trafficking intensified. Methamphetamine production increasingly overtook opium as a regional and global problem. During Myanmar’s period of quasi-democracy from 2010 to 2020, bilateral trade expanded, and Thailand became one of Myanmar’s largest investors. Yet narcotics trafficking, irregular migration, and other cross-border problems persisted. The 2021 coup dramatically intensified these challenges. Conflict, displacement, and humanitarian needs expanded, while the border area around Myawaddy, including Shwe Kokko and KK Park, became cyber-scam hubs operated by transnational criminal networks and Border Guard Forces under Myanmar military command. The Golden Triangle also remains a major center of synthetic drug production. A Long-Standing Military Relationship The military relationship between Thailand and Myanmar is closer than is often recognized. Since the 1960s, military-to-military contacts have survived periods of political disagreement and border tension. Both countries have experienced strong military influence over politics, creating institutional familiarity between their armed forces. There is, however, an important contrast. Thailand’s military institutions have coexisted with an increasingly diversified economy and political system, while Myanmar’s military has retained exclusive control over the state and economy. Myanmar’s generals and their cronies have accumulated enormous wealth and influence through control of national resources and lucrative enterprises, contributing to the country’s prolonged economic decline. Since the 2021 coup, military cooperation has continued in areas including border security and technology, while the Myanmar military has expanded airstrikes and drone warfare against civilians across the country. These historical bilateral relations help explain Bangkok’s view that isolation alone cannot resolve the problems spilling across its border. But they also create a potential blind spot that could lead to political accommodation. An Icebreaker – or a Rank-Breaker? Thailand’s desire for a dual-track approach is understandable. Bangkok must deal directly with border instability, refugee flows, transnational crime, cyber-scam networks, narcotics trafficking, migration, and humanitarian pressures. Bangkok has pushed to promote Myanmar’s gradual reintegration into ASEAN and has described itself as a “bridge.” Its engagement can therefore be constructive if it uses that access to encourage compliance with ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC) and facilitate broader political dialogue. But there is a clear trap. Thailand is hosting the junta leader on August 6–7, providing an opportunity for engagement while raising concerns that such high-level contact could inadvertently contribute to the junta’s search for legitimacy. If such bilateral engagement is perceived as normalization without accountability, it could unintentionally reduce the diplomatic costs of the junta’s continued non-compliance with the 5PC. Thailand’s challenge is therefore not whether to engage Myanmar. It is how to engage without weakening ASEAN’s collective framework. As a founding member of ASEAN, Thailand has a responsibility to safeguard the organization’s unity and the credibility of its commitments. Its bilateral diplomacy should reinforce ASEAN’s collective leverage rather than provide a bypass. The Wise Broker Thailand can play a valuable role precisely because of its access to Myanmar’s military leadership and its geographical proximity that many other ASEAN members do not possess. But a broker must also recognize the limits of bilateral diplomacy. A durable political settlement will require engagement with stakeholders beyond Naypyidaw, including ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), political parties, civil society actors, and the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF) – a collective leadership body established by the National Unity Government (NUG), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), and major EAOs including the Karen National Union (KNU), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karenni National Progressive Party/Interim Executive Council (KNPP/IEC), and Chin National Front (CNF). Engaging the SCEF as a coalition entity and other EAOs outside the coalition does not require Thailand or ASEAN to recognize or endorse any particular actor. Acknowledging Myanmar’s political reality through broader engagement with all major stakeholders, based on political inclusivity rather than institutional control, would give Thailand and ASEAN a more complete understanding of developments on the ground and increase the prospects for an eventual political settlement. Thailand’s ASEAN Responsibility The people of both countries have interests that transcend military-to-military relations. They seek peace, border stability, lawful cross-border commerce, economic opportunity, legal employment and migration, humanitarian protection, and cultural and educational exchange. Ultimately, they share an interest in living peacefully within the ASEAN community. Thailand’s unique position can therefore become an asset for ASEAN. Bangkok can use its established channels with Myanmar to enco