China views ethnic armed organizations as strategic tools, not allies, analysis suggests

China's engagement with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Myanmar is based on a pragmatic "risk management" approach rather than ideological alliance or proxy support, aiming for border stability and the protection of its own strategic and economic interests, according to an analysis. The analysis, titled "Managing the Margins: China’s Risk Calculus in Myanmar’s Civil War," was written by Htet Shine Linn, a researcher from ISP-Myanmar, and published by the Singapore-based ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute on July 9. According to the paper, China's calculations in dealing with EAOs are based on three main factors: proximity to China's strategic projects and geographical location, its ability to exert pressure on Naypyidaw, and the EAOs' capacity to act independently of Chinese influence. Based on these factors, China is assessed to be employing three patterns in its engagement with EAOs: "Tolerant Containment," "Tactical Accommodation," and "Enablement Preceding Restraint." The paper notes that the United Wa State Army (UWSA) is dealt with under the "Tolerant Containment" pattern, while the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Arakan Army (AA) are approached with "Tactical Accommodation." Furthermore, the "Enablement Preceding Restraint" pattern has been used for the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). The paper points out that while China did not intervene in the initial stages of the October 27, 2023, offensive, it exerted pressure for a ceasefire in 2024 after the MNDAA captured Lashio. Subsequently, the MNDAA withdrew from Lashio, and ceasefire talks also occurred with the TNLA. Regarding the KIA, the paper states that after controlling rare earth mining areas, China imposed border closures, power cuts, and restrictions on commodity flow. However, it later reopened the border and allowed rare earth exports to resume. In relation to the AA, the paper analyzes that China is primarily focused on the security of projects like the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and oil and gas pipelines. Contact between the two sides has increased after the AA began expressing its welcome for foreign investment. The paper concludes by stating that China does not view EAOs as long-term strategic partners but rather as strategic tools that can be used to exert pressure on Naypyidaw as needed and to protect its interests in Myanmar. Therefore, when the actions of an EAO are perceived to harm China's long-term interests, China can change its stance at any time, the paper concludes. Note – This is a Policy Perspective paper published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, based on the analysis of a researcher from ISP-Myanmar, and the views expressed are those of the author's research.