From PrimeWater to Hiraya: P6.7B Question Looms Over Renamed Water Utility

Lucio Co has renamed PrimeWater and pledged P6.7 billion to fix the company. But a new name cannot erase years of service failures—and the numbers raise a more challenging question: is P6.7 billion enough to turn PrimeWater into Hiraya? What’s in a name? On June 10, 2026, PrimeWater Infrastructure Corp. was renamed Hiraya Water Corp., an aspirational name evoking hope and renewal. But can a corporate transfiguration wash away years of public distrust? For many consumers, PrimeWater came to mean dry taps, weak pressure, poor water quality, and mounting frustration. Lucio Co’s Crystal Bridges Holding Corp. may have bought the company from the Villar family, but changing a corporate name is far easier than changing what people remember. Before Hiraya can sell the promise of a fresh start, Lucio Co must first determine the actual cost of fixing the existing issues of the business he bought. Must Read [Vantage Point] PrimeWater’s sellout: A ghost buyer and a broken utility Crystal Bridges has announced P6.7 billion for the initial rehabilitation and expansion of the former PrimeWater network, covering water sources, treatment facilities, pumping stations, reservoirs, pipelines, and other infrastructure. While P6.7 billion sounds like a substantial sum, it pales when placed against the scale of the enterprise. PrimeWater reportedly accumulated joint ventures with roughly 76 local water districts, affecting millions of consumers. We did the math. Divide P6.7 billion by 76—not because Crystal Bridges says it will distribute the money equally, but simply to illustrate the magnitude—and the implied average is only about P88 million per district. That is the number that consumers, regulators, and water districts should keep in mind—not the headline amount. The real question is what P88 million can actually buy. The answer is: not very much if a water system requires major rehabilitation. Project estimates cited in materials obtained by Vantage Point put a three-kilometer transmission line at around P200 million, already more than twice that illustrative P88-million average. And that is merely one pipeline. It does not develop a new water source, build a treatment plant, replace aging distribution pipes across barangays, construct reservoirs or install pumps, filtration systems, backup power, and septage treatment facilities. Water infrastructure consumes capital brutally fast, which is why announcing a nationwide budget without showing where it will be spent tells consumers remarkably little about whether their particular system will actually improve. The arithmetic becomes more uncomfortable when placed beside PrimeWater’s financial history. Under Senate scrutiny, Senator Raffy Tulfo questioned how the company’s loans reportedly ballooned from around P270 million in 2014 to nearly P24 billion by 2024. How, he demanded, were the borrowed funds spent? Debt is not rehabilitation cost, and P24 billion cannot simply be compared with P6.7 billion as though one must cover the other. But it raises a legitimate capital-allocation question: if PrimeWater accumulated almost P24 billion in loans while serious service problems persisted across its concessions, what precisely will another P6.7 billion accomplish differently? That question matters because PrimeWater’s difficulties were hardly isolated. Tulfo’s office reportedly found 61 of 70 surveyed water districts dissatisfied with the company, while several had issued termination or pre-termination notices. Play Video Crystal Bridges therefore did not acquire one troubled concession requiring a few new pumps and pipes. It acquired a sprawling platform carrying operational problems, contractual disputes, and damaged relationships with communities that depend on it for perhaps the most essential utility of all. San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, demonstrates why another multibillion-peso promise deserves scrutiny rather than applause. PrimeWater allegedly committed P6.8 billion in capital expenditures when its joint venture began in 2018, yet only around P748million was reportedly invested. [Vantage Point] The PrimeWater curse: When contracts trump the public Meanwhile, roughly 47,611 households, representing about 250,000 residents, have suffered poor or unreliable water service. The city’s allegations remain contested, but the comparison is difficult to ignore: PrimeWater had already promised billions before, yet residents eventually found themselves living through a hellish water crisis. The issue facing Lucio Co is therefore not whether P6.7 billion sounds impressive. It is why consumers should believe this multibillion-peso commitment will produce a different outcome. The dispute eventually reached the courts after San Jose del Monte intervened and brought in an interim operator. PrimeWater’s early attempts to obtain emergency relief did not immediately succeed, with public injury from the water crisis weighing in on the proceedings. It subsequently obtained a preliminary injunction from the Las Piñas Regional Trial Court to protect its asserted contractual position while the principal case proceeds. The injunction does not determine who ultimately wins, but the episode underscores the peculiar economics of a public utility: contractual losses can be calculated in pesos, while the cost of unreliable water is dispersed across households, schools, hospitals, and businesses. Lucio Co did not create these problems. But that defense has a short shelf life. When Crystal Bridges bought PrimeWater, it acquired more than assets and revenue streams. It inherited contracts, debt, unfinished obligations, litigation cases, and skeptical customers. The simple rebranding of the business to Hiraya does not reset those liabilities to zero, particularly when the renamed company itself says current legal obligations and privileges remain in effect. This is why the P6.7-billion announcement should be judged by its architecture rather than its size. Which districts will receive funding first? How much goes to source development, pipe replacement, treatment capacity, storage, and non-revenue water reduction? What are the targets for water pressure, supply hours, quality, and leakage? When will projects be completed, and what happens if those benchmarks are missed? Without district-level allocations, implementation schedules ,and measurable service targets, P6.7 billion remains a financing announcement rather than a rehabilitation plan. The timing makes those questions more urgent. El Niño places greater pressure on already fragile systems by tightening water availability precisely when inefficient networks can least afford losses. A utility struggling with leakage, inadequate storage or unreliable sources during normal conditions becomes considerably more vulnerable during prolonged dry conditions. Crystal Bridges therefore does not have the luxury of treating rehabilitation as an open-end