China's New Ethnic Unity Law Tests International Response

Read The Diplomat, Know The Asia-Pacific The conventional tools previously used to penalize China for its rights abuses – sanctions, public pressure, condemnation, institutional mechanisms, and more – have all been blunted. A draconian new law in China took effect on July 1, after passing the National People’s Congress back in March. The “Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress” is the end result of a long shift in governance of China’s minority groups, 55 in total. Far from the post-1949 model of ethnic autonomy, as this new legal framework attempts to “forge” (zhulao) the country’s many distinct peoples into a collective national identity. Southeast Asia has seen this before, evidenced in Thailand’s vague Thainess policy (khwam pen thai), a fascist effort under military strongman Phibun Songkhram. Beijing’s new law forces schools, families, religious organizations and bodies, the media, and its military to promote this new identity, mandating Mandarin language instruction and giving Chinese script legal priority over minority scripts in public signage. Further, it criminalizes parental instruction deemed harmful to unity and extends legal accountability to organizations and individuals outside China’s borders, a further extension of China’s transnational repression efforts. China’s ethnic policy shift can be traced to unrest in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009, which provided the CCP the domestic legitimacy to unpack a security narrative, even as there is credible and overwhelming evidence that those incidents can be traced to Han in-migration and forgotten promises of autonomy. Even for Chinese President Xi Jinping, this new law is a giant leap in control over ethnic identities. After taking power in 2012, he first embraced smaller regional steps, seen in provincial regulations in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia before rolling out the nationwide campaign. This law represents a new form of fascism for China, complete with a preamble that describes a “community of common destiny bound by intertwined bloodlines, common beliefs, cultural similarities, economic interdependence, and close emotional ties.” It is common for fascist states to prioritize ideological supremacy and an identity forged around forced assimilation rather than a recognition of ethnic diversity. The question now is who might challenge it. It’s very unlikely anyone within China will be able to effectively resist. The CCP has effectively neutralized the prospect of domestic challenges to even its most draconian policies. The new law was preceded by lengthy crackdowns against Uyghurs, Tibetans, and even Mongolians, who have never posed a security threat to the state. Could the international community step up instead? The short answer is no. First, China’s vast economic size gives it influence over the same governments that are likely to want to pressure Beijing over the “ethnic unity” law. China has a long institutional memory, and knows it can retaliate against companies that distance themselves from Xinjiang supply chains, evidenced by its targeted boycott of fast-fashion giant H&M in 2021. Further, China uses its own legal tools to punish international compliance with sanctions regimes. For instance, when the European Union sanctioned Chinese officials over Xinjiang in 2021, Beijing targeted ten EU citizens, which included parliamentarians, scholars, and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), based in Germany. International bodies like the United Nations have also been terrible at putting pressure on China on its ethnic policy. Even though experts have warned consistently that China’s law conflicts with many human rights instruments that it has already ratified, member states have been passive in their objections. China’s power within the U.N. has grown considerably and has yielded results. When another draconian law, the National Security Law for Hong Kong (NSL), was approved in 2020, a large number of U.N. member states publicly supported it, despite the international outcry. To blunt criticism, the NSL specifically targeted foreign criticism and tools of statecraft in Part 4, where foreigners who advocate for independence or call for sanctions on China could be prosecuted upon entering Hong Kong or mainland China. Finally, the people and the institutions that are required to both document the law’s implementation and then build a proper response have been compromised or are within Beijing’s reach. China already targets MERICS back in 2021. The new ethnic law’s extraterritorial provisions, under its Article 63, provide a structural incentive for people who work in areas that could put pressure on China to keep quiet. None of this means that there will be no public outcry. Surely there will be. But the most depressing news is that the conventional tools previously used to penalize China for its rights abuses – sanctions, public pressure, condemnation, institutional mechanisms, and more – have all been blunted. Beijing has adapted to predictable international responses and has developed mechanisms of its own to thwart them. For the international human rights community, that means coming up with a new set of tools. Subscribe today and join thousands of diplomats, analysts, policy professionals and business readers who rely on The Diplomat for expert Asia-Pacific coverage. Get unlimited access to in-depth analysis you won't find anywhere else, from South China Sea tensions to ASEAN diplomacy to India-Pakistan relations. More than 5,000 articles a year. Already have an account? Log in. Mark S. Cogan is an Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kansai Gaidai University in Osaka, Japan. Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific.